Relief for the Wage Earner: Regulation of Garnishment Under Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act by Moran, Robert D
Boston College Law Review
Volume 14
Issue 5 Special Issue The Revenue Act of 1971 Article 3
11-1-1970
Relief for the Wage Earner: Regulation of
Garnishment Under Title III of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act
Robert D. Moran
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert D. Moran, Relief for the Wage Earner: Regulation of Garnishment Under Title III of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 14 B.C.L. Rev. 101 (1973), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/
vol14/iss5/3
RELIEF FOR THE WAGE EARNER: REGULATION
OF GARNISHMENT UNDER TITLE III OF THE
CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
ROBERT D. MORAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In his latest book, Points of Rebellion,1 Supreme Court Justice
William 0. Douglas discusses some of the inequities of life for the
rich and poor in America. He argues that the impoverished condition
of the poor is perpetuated by the American legal system. As an exam-
ple, he states:
We got rid of our debtors' prisons in the last century.
But today's garnishment proceedings are as destructive and
vicious as the debtors' dungeons. Employers have often dis-
charged workers whose wages are garnisheed; and the total
runs over 250,000 a year. In many states the percentage of
wages garnisheed has been so high that a man and his family
are often reduced to a starvation level .2
The federal government has shown an awareness of the problem
of uncontrolled garnishment. On May 29, 1968 Congress enacted the
Consumer Credit Protection Act3 to bring uniform national standards
to the field of consumer finance and to stop the uninformed use of
credit. Title III of the Act, which regulates the garnishment of wages
and brings a measure of relief to those who previously were forced
to exist at the starvation level because of garnishment, became effec-
tive on July 1, 1970.4
One of Justice Douglas' major fears for the potential victims of
garnishment was that consumer credit traditionally has been governed
almost entirely by state law, which has been influenced by the power-
ful finance company lobbies. As of July 1, 1970 this fear has been
alleviated. In providing for federal regulation of consumer credit, Con-
gress employed its wide powers under the Constitution to establish
uniform bankruptcy laws6 and to regulate commerce.° The coverage
* Mr. Moran is Administrator of the Wage
of Labor and a member of the Massachusetts Bar.
1 W. Douglas, Points of Rebellion (1970).
2 Id. at 48.
-13 Consumer Credit Protection ACt, 15 U.S.C.
4 The delay in the effective date of Title
federal regulation of garnishment within their
similar laws of their own.
5 U.S. Const. art. I, 8.
6 Id.; 15 U.S.C. 4 1671(b) (Supp. IV, 1969)
and Hour Division of the Department
$g 1671-77 (Supp. IV, 1969).
was designed to permit states to avoid
jurisdiction by enacting substantially
•
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of the Act is, therefore, complete; no employer is excluded from the
provisions of Title III regardless of the size of his establishment or the
extent of his involvement in interstate commerce.
The congressional purpose in entering the combat zone so
familiar to collection attorneys, small claims court judges and the
working poor, was to discourage the spread of predatory extensions of
credit. Section 301(a) of the Act fully explains:
(1) The unrestricted garnishment of compensation due for
personal services encourages the making of predatory
extensions of credit. Such extensions of credit divert
money into excessive credit payments and thereby hinder
the production and flow of goods in interstate commerce.
(2) The application of garnishment as a creditors' remedy
frequently results in loss of employment by the debtor,
and the resulting disruption of employment, production,
and consumption constitutes a substantial burden on
interstate commerce.
(3) The great disparities among the laws of the several
States relating to garnishment have, in effect, destroyed
the uniformity of the bankruptcy laws and frustrated
the purposes thereof in many areas of the country.'
It was also hoped that a creditor, who in the past made credit sales
with complete disregard for the carrying capacity of the debtor because
of the possibility of unlimited garnishment, would henceforth exercise
restraint in order not to oversell credit to his customer.
II. PROVISIONS OF TITLE III
A. Limitations on Garnishment
The new Act, in Section 303(a), prohibits any garnishment in a
single work-week which exceeds the lesser of either (1) 25 percent
of an employee's dispbsable earnings for that week, or (2) the amount
by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed 30 times the
minimum hourly wage prescribed by Section 6(a) (1) 8 of the Fair
Labor Standards Act .°
"Disposable earnings" would not usually be the same thing as
"take-home pay." "Disposable earnings" is defined in the law as "that
part of the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduc-
tion from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be with-
held.'" Items reqUired by law to be withheld include federal and State
7 151.1.S.C.* 1671(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
8 Section 6(a) (1) currently provides for a minimum wage of $1.60 per hour.
29 U.S.C. 206 (1964).
10 IS U.S.C. 1672(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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income tax deductions and Social Security. While other deductions may
be made from an employee's gross wages as a result of a contract, for
example, an assignment of wages, or for the convenience of the em-
ployee, such amounts are still included in disposable income for the
purpose of the Act, even though they are not paid directly to the
worker.
The following examples illustrate the statutory tests for deter-
mining the amounts subject to garnishment. A. An employee's dis-
posable weekly earnings are $112. Using the first test, 25 percent of
the disposable earnings is $28. According to the second test, 30 times
the current minimum wage of $1.60 per hour is $48, and the amount
of his disposable earnings in excess of $48 is $64. Since $28 is less
than $64, the maximum amount which may be garnisheed from his
wages this particular week is $28. B. An employee earns only $62 a
week in disposable earnings. By the first test, 25 percent of the dis-
posable earnings is $15.50. Applying the second test, we find that the
amount of his disposable earnings in excess of $48 is $14. Since $14 is
less $15.50, $14 is the maximum amount which can be garnisheed
in this week."
The formula is fairly simple to understand. There can be no gar-
nishment which reduces an individual's disposable earnings below $48
per week." Thus, the full 25 percent limit is not applicable in any case
where the employee's disposable earnings are less than $64 per week."
Whether Title III will achieve the beneficial results its sponsors
intended will depend partially at least upon whether wage assignments
may be used to circumvent the purposes of the Act. An assignment of
wages is a private transaction under which an employee voluntarily
transfers to another person his right to receive all or part of his wages,
while a garnishment is defined by section 302(c) as "any legal or equi-
table procedures through which the earnings of any individual are
required to be withheld for payment of any debt." (Emphasis added.)
A question remains whether the definition of garnishment is broad
enough to include those wage assignments which are currently sanc-
tioned by state law." There is some precedent for an affirmative con-
The discussion herein has been confined to employees paid on a weekly basis.
Where employees are paid less frequently, the same principle applies.
12 The $48 floor holds for the current minimum wage. If, however, the minimum
wage should be raised, the floor too would rise. For example, there are currently bills
pending in Congress to raise the minimum wage to $2 per hour, At such a wage, the limit
on garnishments would be $60.
18 Title III specifies three instances where the above restrictions on the amount of
garnishment will not apply: (1) court orders for the support of any person, (2) Chapter
XIII bankruptcy court orders, and (3) debts due for either state or federal taxes. IS
U.S.C. 1673(b) (Supp. IV, 1969). •
14 The Solicitor of Labor, however, in an unpublished opinion dated February 10,
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elusion in New York where a state court held in City & Suburban
Homes Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc. 15 that a wage assignment could
be treated the same as a garnishment for the purpose of garnishment
proceedings, that is, that the law does not permit simultaneous deduc-
tions from an employee's wages for a wage assignment and a garnish-
ment. This precedent is somewhat stronger than would usually be the
case between state and federal courts since the federal garnishment
restrictions, according to statements made during the congressional
debates, were patterned after the New York garnishment restrictions. 14
There is also some congressional history that might support a
conclusion to the contrary. During the House debates on this measure,
Congressman Whitener of North Carolina stated:
I do not know whether it is an oversight or not—that there
is nothing said about the assignment of wages procedures
available in most States of the Union. The assignment of
wages procedure[s] are the ones that an unscrupulous busi-
nessman will be using . . . . I see nothing here that prevents
an unscrupulous merchant getting his customer to assign
wages at the time he makes a purchase. That is not a garnish-
ment procedure and would not be precluded by the bill. 11
Even if administrative interpretation does not plug the potential
loophole of wage assignments, it is unlikely that such assignments will
be long permitted to frustrate the purposes of the new garnishment
restrictions. The courts may well strike them down on the basis of
the reasoning set forth by the Supreme Court in the recent case of
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,18 where the Court stressed the
need for the protection against creditors of the unique type of property
interest constituted by weekly wages. Moreover, Congress itself could
take corrective legislative action. One cannot read the congressional
hearings which preceded this law without obtaining a perceptible feel-
ing that our nation's lawmakers are quite unhappy with the existing
system for withholding part of an employee's wages for application
against his debts. The following statement made during the debates on
this measure by Congressman Resnick of New York is illustrative.
I had hoped the distinguished Committee . . . would have
seen fit to completely eliminate the garnishment racket. For
1970, concluded that the definition of garnishment in 4 302(c) does not include wage
assignments.
15 39 Misc. 2d 299, 240 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Civ, Ct. of N.Y. 1963).
10 114 Cong. Rec. 1613 (1968) (remarks of Congressman Wiggins) ; Id. at 1834
(remarks of Congressman Wyman).
17 Id. at 1837 (remarks of Congressman Whitener).
18 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See 11 B. C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 462 (1970).
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a racket it has become—one that each day victimizes the
Nation's workers through shakedowns, lost jobs, personal
anguish, and humiliation. Indeed, I have evidence that proves
that the very fear of garnishment is one of the major causes
of voluntary bankruptcy."
B. Prohibition Against Discharge
The other arm of Title III prohibits the discharge of any employee
"by reason of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to gar-
nishment for any one indebtedness."" This provision, despite its appar-
ent simplicity, will probably be the subject of more controversy than
the limits on the amount of garnishment. It does not permit the dis-
charge of an employee on or after the second garnishment for the same
debt since it speaks in terms of "indebtedness." If interpreted literally
the prohibition would remain through any number of garnishments
resulting from the same indebtedness.
The indebtedness standard is somewhat subjective. If, for ex-
ample, the wages of an employee were garnisheed as the result of an in-
debtedness to finance company A, and sometime later for a separate
indebtedness to finance company B, it may not be easy to determine
whether the employee's dismissal from his job resulted from the cumu-
lative effect of garnishments from both debts, or was caused solely
by the latest garnishment. Should the employee allege the latter, a
court may ultimately have to determine this question.
An employer who is found to have wrongfully discharged a worker
for garnishment of wages risks a jail sentence, a fine, or both, since the
law provides: "Whoever willfully violates . . . this section shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both."' No one seems to know how many people lose their jobs each
year because of their employers' aversion to garnishments. A cursory
and decidedly unscientific survey conducted by personnel of the
Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor when this law
was under consideration in 196.7 indicated that three percent of the
garnishees surveyed were discharged as a result of wage garnishment."
Six percent of the employers surveyed stated that they would discharge
an employee whose wages were garnisheed.23 While there are no figures
available on the number of garnishments each year, it is probably in
the neighborhood of from one to two million. If one can utilize these
19 114 Cong. Rec. 1613 (1968) (remarks of Congressman Resnick).
20 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
21 15 U.S.C. § 1674(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
22 Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, Survey, Garnishment of
Wages (1967) (unpublished).
28 Id.
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rather shaky premises as a foundation upon which to base a conclusion,
somewhere between 30 and 120 thousand people are discharged each
year because their wages are garnisheed."
C. Enforcement
The Act assigns enforcement responsibility to the Secretary of
Labor, "acting through the Wage and Hour Division of the Depart-
ment of Labor."" Under ideal circumstances, the limitations on gar-
nishment will be self-enforcing. Officials of the Wage and Hour Divi-
sion and Labor Department attorneys have visited most state and
many local officials concerned with wage garnishment to alert them
to the new law, and in some cases have assisted in devising arrange-
ments to ensure that the limitations contained in the law are observed.
In a number of locales, authorities plan to print the federal restric-
tions on the face of the process used in their garnishment proceedings.
In other cases, court procedural rules are being amended to prevent
issuance of garnishments in amounts greater than permitted under
federal law.
The burden of adhering to the federal limitations on amounts of
garnishment is placed on the courts under Section 303 (c) of the Act
which provides: "No court of the United States or any State may
make, execute, or enforce any order or process in violation of this
section."
D. State Garnishment Laws
Under the constitutional doctrine of federal supremacy, it has
been held that once the Congress enacts legislation, that legislation
becomes part of the supreme law of the land, and any state law to the
contrary may thereby be superseded." Congress took special precau-
tions to avoid this doctrine by stating explicitly that:
[t] his subchapter does not annul, alter or affect, or exempt
any person from complying with, the laws of any State (1)
prohibiting garnishments or providing for more limited gar-
nishment than are allowed under this subchapter, or (2) pro-
hibiting the discharge of any employee by reason of the fact
that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for more
than one indebtedness."
In other words, where State restrictions are stronger than the new
24 This estimate appears to be on the conservative side when compared with the
250,000 figure cited by Mr. Justice Douglas in the opening paragraph of this article.
25 15 .U.S.C. I676.(Supp. IV, 1969).
20 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
27 15 U.S.C. § 1677 (Supp. IV, 1969).
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federal restrictions, it will be state law which regulates the garnish-
ments in that state.
Provision is also made for the state law to apply in lieu of the
federal law where the Secretary of Labor determines that the laws of
that state provide restrictions on garniShment which are "substantially
similar" to the federal rules. 28
 Although there does not now exist full
and explicit guidelines on what constitutes "substantially similar"
restrictions, it is .unlikely that any state law will meet the test if it
permits, under any circumstances, the garnishment of a greater amount
of money from any employee's pay than is allowed under the federal
law.
III. CONCLUSION
Wright Patman, the Chairman of the House Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, discussed the effect of the new law on consumer
credit during the House debate on this measure:
There are those who contend that if we restrict the garnish-
ment of wages, there will be a sharp cutback in consumer
credit. However, available evidence demonstrates that this
argument is false. States—such as my own State of Texas,
Pennsylvania, Florida, and New York—have either abolished
the use of garnishment or have laws similar to the one pro-
posed here by your Committee. The levels of consumer credit
in those states are as high, if not higher, than they are in
States having the harshest of garnishment laws'
The congressional hearings which preceded enactment of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act brought out a rather dramatic correlation
between wage garnishment and personal bankruptcies. In states where
a creditor can obtain wage garnishments easily, personal bankruptcies
ranged between two hundred and three hundred per 100,000 pop-
ulation." But in Pennsylvania and Texas, where garnishments are
prohibited, personal bankruptcies were nine per 100,000 and five per
100,000 respectively."
It is unlikely that the new federal restrictions will produce this
kind of drastic reduction in personal bankruptcies. They may, how-
ever, discourage those who sell goods and loan money on the expecta-
tion that their collection efforts will be enhanced either by the
prospect of unrestricted garnishment or by the employee's fear of
28 15 U.S.C. § 1675 (Supp. IV, 1969).
29 114 Cong. Rec. 1427 (1968) (remarks of Congressman Patman).
so H.R. Rep. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 20 (1967).
81 Id.
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dismissal by an employer who objects to the administrative burden
of having the wages of one of his employees garnisheed.
The feeling in Congress during the hearings seemed to be that the
new garnishment law would reduce the number of personal bank-
ruptcies and increase the likelihood that merchants and others who
extended credit would be paid in full for their goods or services rather
than have the debt discharged in bankruptcy. If that proves to be the
result, then Congress has come up with the closest measure yet to a
model law—one that helps both debtors and creditors.
Based on the number of pledges of cooperation received to date
from local courts, it appears certain that Title III of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act will take effect smoothly, bringing some relief
and protection to the unsuspecting consumer who is a potential victim
of garnishment. In addition, with effective enforcement by the Wage
and Hour Division, Title III will benefit the entire American public
by ensuring that there are no unnecessary disruptions of employment,
production, or commerce.
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